Stephen Downes on Learning/Knowledge

# (Log in as Guest) Where connectivism differs from those theories, I would argue, is that
connectivism denies that knowledge is propositional. That is to say,
these other theories are 'cognitivist', in the sense that they depict
knowledge and learning as being grounded in language and logic.



Connectivism is, by contrast, 'connectionist'. Knowledge is, on this theory, literally
the set of connections formed by actions and experience. It may consist
in part of linguistic structures, but it is not essentially based in
linguistic structures, and the properties and constraints of linguistic
structures are not the properties and constraints of connectivism.



In
connectivism, a phrase like 'constructing meaning' makes no sense.
Connections form naturally, through a process of association, and are
not 'constructed' through some sort of intentional action. And
'meaning' is a property of language and logic, connoting referential
and representational properties of physical symbol systems. Such
systems are epiphenomena of (some) networks, and not descriptive of or
essential to these networks.



Hence, in connectivism, there is no
real concept of transferring knowledge, making knowledge, or building
knowledge. Rather, the activities we undertake when we conduct
practices in order to learn are more like growing or developing
ourselves and our society in certain (connected) ways.



This
implies a pedagogy that (a) seeks to describe 'successful' networks (as
identified by their properties, which I have characterized as
diversity, autonomy, openness, and connectivity) and (b) seeks to
describe the practices that lead to such networks, both in the
individual and in society (which I have characterized as modeling and
demonstration (on the part of a teacher) and practice and reflection
(on the part of a learner)).

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